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Abstract
We investigate the spatial Public Goods Game in the presence of fitness-driven and conformity-
driven agents. This framework usually considers only the former type of agents, i.e., agents that tend
to imitate the strategy of their fittest neighbors. However, whenever we study social systems, the
evolution of a population might be affected also by social behaviors as conformism, stubbornness,
altruism, and selfishness. Although the term evolution can assume different meanings depending
on the considered domain, here it corresponds to the set of processes that lead a system towards an
equilibrium or a steady-state. We map fitness to the agents’ payoff so that richer agents are those
most imitated by fitness-driven agents, while conformity-driven agents tend to imitate the strategy
assumed by the majority of their neighbors. Numerical simulations aim to identify the nature of
the transition, on varying the amount of the relative density of conformity-driven agents in the
population, and to study the nature of related equilibria. Remarkably, we find that conformism
generally fosters ordered cooperative phases and may also lead to bistable behaviors.
∗ marcojavarone@gmail.com
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In the last two decades, Evolutionary Game Theory [1–6] (EGT) has strongly developed
into a mature field that, nowadays, represents a vivid and independent research area with
a list of applications spanning from biology to social systems [1, 3, 7–11]. In particular,
EGT constitutes a powerful tool for modelling a myriad of natural phenomena characterized
by evolutionary dynamics [12] and complex interaction patterns [13]. The emergence of
cooperation [14] is one of the central topics in EGT. The Prisoner’s Dilemma [3] (PD) and
its n-person PD, also called Public Goods Game, represent the typical game-theoretical
framework in which individual and group interests collide. In fact, in the PD game two
players can decide to mutually cooperate for achieving a common goal and, at the same time,
are both tempted to exploit their opponent in order to obtain an higher payoff at the expense
of the other player. Among other mechanisms [15], network reciprocity has been proposed
as a fundamental tool to promote cooperation in structured populations of unlabeled and
anonymous individuals. Recently, a series of works [8, 18, 19] unveiled that, even when
agents’ interactions are based upon Nash Equilibria [20] in which defection (not cooperation)
theoretically dominates cooperative strategies, agent, and even human, populations are able
to attain a cooperative equilibrium [18, 19, 21–26]. In this context, it is interesting to
identify behaviors and properties that may lead a population towards cooperation, although
defection is risk-less and constitutes, egoistically, the most convenient strategy. For instance,
random or purposeful motion [16–19, 25] and competitiveness [24] are able to increase the
level of cooperation in the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma. Remarkably, EGT allows also to
study the role of peer influences in social dilemmas, as reported in [27, 28]. In [27] the
authors investigate the role of conformism [29] in social dilemmas, by simulating a two-
species population whose agents, embedded in a scale-free network [30], play pairwise the PD
game with their neighbors; the two species forming the population were payoff-driven agents
and conformist agents. Their result shows that conformism can enhance social reciprocity
highlighting its beneficial role in the resolution of social dilemmas. In [28], the authors report
that scale-free networks reduce the amplification of cooperation when an opportune amount
of conformists is introduced in the imitation rules. It is worth observing that conformism
is one of the most investigated behaviors in the field of sociophysics [31, 32], i.e, the field
attempting to analyze socio-economic systems under the lens of statistical physics [31, 33].
Moreover, conformism has been shown to deeply influence opinion dynamics [33–35], and
more in general phenomena of social spreading, as well as evolutionary dynamics [27, 36].
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For instance, in [35, 36] the authors show that conformism (and nonconformism) can lead
a population towards a disordered phase, i.e., a coexistence of different agents, and towards
non-linear dynamics (e.g. bistability).
In the present work, we investigate the spatial Public Goods Game (PGG hereinafter)
by considering a population composed of conformity-driven agents and fitness-driven agents.
Thus, while the former tend to update their strategy with the most adopted one in their
neighborhood, the latter tend to imitate their richest neighbor (i.e., the most fitted). Al-
though the PGG exhibits a theoretically predicted Nash Equilibrium of defection, previous
works identified several strategies to support cooperation, spanning from awarding mecha-
nisms (e.g. [21]) to optimal game settings. Notably, in [21] authors report that the synergy
factor, usually indicated as r, adopted to compute the agents’ payoff, can be opportunely
tuned in order to support cooperation on bi-dimensional regular lattices. This result is very
important as it entails that if the payoff of cooperators reaches, or overtakes, a minimum
value, all agents turn their strategy to cooperation. As below, the minimum threshold of the
synergy factor depends on the topology of the population (i.e., the way agents are arranged).
Therefore, adding a social influence in the PGG implies dealing with two degrees of freedom:
the synergy factor r (whose individual effect is known) and the density of conformist agents
ρc. The proposed model is studied by means of numerical simulations and performed by
arranging agents that play a spatial PGG on a bi-dimensional regular lattice with periodic
boundary conditions.
We now introduce the model studied in this Letter. In general, the PGG considers a
population of N agents that can adopt two different strategies: cooperation and defection.
At each time step, cooperators provide a unitary contribution to a common pool, whereas
defectors do the opposite, i.e., not contribute. Then, the payoff of a cooperator (i.e., pic) and
that of a defector (i.e., pid) read pi
c = rN
c
G
− c
pid = rN
c
G
(1)
where N c is the number of cooperators among the G agents involved in the game (i.e., the
considered agent with its neighbors), r synergy factor, and c agents’ contribution (we set
to 1 for all cooperators, without the loss of generality). As we discuss below, the value
of G depends on the topology adopted to arrange the agent population. After all agents
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Cooperation diagram on varying ρc in a population with N = 10
4. a ρc in
range ∈ [0.0, 1.0]. b ρc in range ∈ [0.9, 1.0]. Red corresponds to areas of cooperation, while blue
to those of defection. Results are averaged over 50 simulation runs and have been computed using
11× 11 parameter values.
have made a decision and accumulated their corresponding payoff, they undergo a round of
strategy revision phase, i.e., they can change their strategy from cooperation to defection,
or vice versa. In doing so, the population evolves until it reaches a final equilibrium (or
steady-state). The synergy factor plays a key role in this dynamics [21], as it promotes
cooperation. Notably, it is possible to compute, for a given topology (e.g. square lattice),
the minimal value of r, here denoted as rm, for which any r > rm allows cooperators to
survive, or even to dominate. From a statistical physics perspective, in particular refer-
ring to the Curie-Weiss model [37], we can now identify two different phases (or equilibria)
[38]: a paramagnetic equilibrium in which we observe the coexistence of cooperators and
defectors, and a ferromagnetic equilibrium, implying that one species prevails. Typically,
the basic dynamics of the PGG let agents change their strategy according to rules based on
the payoff [4], e.g. agents imitate their richest neighbor, which is our definition of rational
thinking [39]. In our model we aim to investigate the outcomes of the PGG in heterogeneous
populations, i.e. composed of fitness-driven agents (FDAs) and conformity-driven agents
(CDAs). Specifically, we map the fitness to the agents’s payoff, so that the richest one is the
fittest one. This assumption is far from general, as the fitness might be related to various
factors, but we believe to be anyhow characterizing several realistic economic systems. Thus,
in our model, FDAs tend imitate the richest neighbors, while CDAs tend imitate the most
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adopted strategy. So the imitation process, in particular for CDAs, depends on the local
connectivity of the underlying interaction structure (i.e. the adopted topology). As result
our population is composed of N = Nf +Nc agents, with Nf is the number of FDAs and Nc
that of CDAs. Thus, we can introduce ρf = Nf/N and ρc = Nc/N to identify the density
of FDAs and CDAs, respectively. For the sake of clarity, we use the convention in which
upper indices refer to the strategy (i.e. cooperation and defection), while lower indices to
the agent’s nature (i.e. conformity-driven and fitness-driven). Both FDAs and CDAs change
strategy by a stochastic rule. In particular, we implement a Fermi rule [21] to compute
the transition probability between two different strategies for FDAs, so that the y-th agent
imitates the x-th one, which reads
W (sy ← sx) =
(
1 + exp
[
piy − pix
K
])−1
(2)
where sx and sy indicate the strategy of the agents x and y, respectively, meanwhile pix
and piy indicate their payoff; the constant K parametrizes the uncertainty in adopting a
strategy. By using K = 0.5, we implement a rational and meritocratic approach during
the strategy revision phase [21]. CDAs adopt a simple majority voting [31] rule to decide
their next strategy: an agent computes the transition probability according to the density
of neighbors having the strategy of majority. In doing so, FDAs act rationally, while CDAs
follow a social behavior (i.e. conformism). Following the prescription of [21], we arrange
agents in a bi-dimensional regular lattice of degree 4 with periodic boundary conditions (a
torus). Summarizing, our population evolves according to the following steps:
1. At t = 0, set an equal number of cooperators and defectors, and the density of con-
formists ρc ∈ [0, 1];
2. select randomly one agent x, and select randomly one of its neighbors y;
3. each selected agent plays the PGG with all its five communities, then computes its
payoff;
4. agent y performs the strategy revision phase according to its nature;
5. repeat from (2) until an ordered phase is reached, or up to a limited number of time
steps elapsed.
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Variance (σM ) of the order parameter M as a function of the synergy factor
r, for different configurations: a N = 104. b ρc = 0.0. c ρc = 0.3. d ρc = 0.6. Since we adopted a
logarithmic scale for the y-axis, we highlight that all values equal to 10−5 correspond to 0.
We remark that the neighborhood for each agent has always 4 agents. Therefore, one agent
plays in 5 different groups at a time, all composed of 5 members. Finally, we remind that
agents may change strategy, i.e. from cooperation to defection (and vice versa), but they
cannot change their nature (i.e. fitness-driven and conformity-driven). Although in real
social systems individuals might change also their behavior (e.g. from CDA to FDA), in this
work we aim to analyze the relation between the density of CDAs and the outcomes of the
PGG. Therefore, we need to assume agents keep constant their behavior.
We investigate the behavior of the proposed model for different values of ρc, from 0 to 1,
and of r. The latter assumes values in the range [3, 6] since, in this topology, it is known
from [21] that the two thresholds for different equilibria are rm = 3.74 and rM = 5.49 in a
FDA population. The threshold rm indicates that lower values of r lead the population to-
wards a phase of full defection at equilibrium. For intermediate values of r, i.e. rm ≤ r ≤ rM ,
the population reaches a disordered phase, i.e. a mixed phase characterized by the coexis-
tence of both species at equilibrium; eventually, for values of r > rM cooperators succeed,
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i.e. the population reaches an ordered phase of full cooperation. In order to investigate
the proposed model, we perform numerical simulations with populations of different size,
from N = 102 to N = 104. The first analysis is related to the distribution of strategies, at
equilibrium, on varying the synergy factor r and the density of conformists ρc — see figure 1.
It is worth noting that the disordered phase becomes narrower as ρc increases. Notably, we
observe that rm and rM are strongly affected by ρc. At a first glance, as also reported in [27],
conformism fosters cooperation, as rM strongly reduces while increasing ρc. On the other
hand, for ρc = 1 a bistable behavior is expected as agents change strategy without consider-
ing the payoff. In particular, the minimal threshold of synergy factor to avoid cooperators
disappear reduces to values smaller than r = 3.75 (computed in [21] and confirmed here
for ρc = 0.0) when ρc is greater than 0.85. Moreover, considering the higher threshold rM
(i.e. that to obtain full cooperation for ρc = 0.0), we observe that even with low density
of conformist agents, rM decreases, up to reach a value slightly smaller than 4.0. In the
range ρc ∈ [0.9, 1.0], a closer look allows to note a richer behavior of our model — see plot
b of figure 1. We notice that defectors succeed only for values of r smaller than 3.6, while
cooperators succeed for values of r greater than 3.78. As result the mixed phase is obtained
only in a narrow range between the two listed values (i.e. 3.6 ≤ r ≤ 3.78). For values of
ρc ≥ 0.97 a bistable behavior can be observed: sometimes cooperators succeed, while other
times fail (i.e. defectors succeed). Thus, since our results are computed as average values
of different simulation runs, the colors represented in both plots of figure 1 in some cases
reflect the probability to find the final population in a given status starting with those initial
conditions (i.e. r and ρc).
In order to characterize the transition at fixed ρc, since we observe qualitatively different
phases, we tentatively try to identify the transition lines by studying the behavior of the
variance as a function of r, which as we will see play the role of inverse ‘temperature’. Here,
the variance σM is referred to the magnetization of the system [40], which we identify as our
order parameter, and given by
M =
1
N
N∑
i=1
si (3)
with si strategy of the i-th agent, i.e. s = ±1. Hence, the variance σM is computed
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Probability to succeed as a function of the synergy factor r, in a population
with N = 104, for the two species: cooperators, i.e., red dotted line (Diamonds ♦), and defectors,
i.e., blue dotted line (Circles ◦). a ρc = 0.0. b ρc = 0.9. c ρc = 0.99.
numerically, but can be easily identified as the susceptibility of the order parameter χ,
σM =
1
Z
Z∑
i=1
(Mi − 〈M〉)2 ≡ χ (4)
with Z number of simulations performed under the same conditions (i.e. fixed r and ρc) and
〈M〉 average magnetization (computed in the same conditions). Plot a of figure 2 (a) shows
the variance σM for different values of ρc: 0, 0.3, 0.6, 0.9, as a function of the synergy factor r.
As expected, we found that for ρc = 0.0 the variance is maximum at rm ∼ 3.75. Plots b, c, d
of figure 2 illustrate how these curves scale as we increase the number of agents for ρc = 0.0,
ρc = 0.3 and ρc = 0.6, respectively. We observe that in the case ρc = 0.6, the limit N →∞ is
critical, i.e. we find that there seem to exist a rcrit for which limN→∞ χN ≡ χ ≈ (r− rcrit)−α
for some exponent α > 0. The universality class will be studied elsewhere.
Then, in order to characterize the bistable behavior shown in Figure 1, we study the
probability for the system of being in the defecting or in the cooperating phase at the end
of the simulation, as a function of r (see figure 3) and of ρc (see figure 4). In figure 3 the
two dotted lines refer to the winning probabilities of defectors (i.e., blue) and of cooperators
(i.e., red). Therefore, for ρc = 0.0, the two curves are zero in the intermediate range of r,
i.e., 3.75 ≤ r ≤ rM , as none is expected to completely succeed. Remarkably, increasing
ρc we found a decreasing paramagnetic range of r, disappearing for values ρc ≥ 0.8. As
shown in plots b and c of figure 3, at least one curve is always greater than zero. Although
we are dealing with success probabilities, it is worth noting that the summation of values
taken by the two curves has to be ≤ 1, thus even zero as it means that none succeeds
once the disordered phase is reached. Moreover, figure 3 allows to observe the emergence
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Probability to succeed as a function of the density of conformists ρc, in a
population with N = 104, for the two species: cooperators, i.e., red dotted line (Diamonds ♦), and
defectors, i.e., blue dotted line (Circles ◦). a r = 3.75. b r = 4.0. c r = 5.25.
of a bistable behavior, e.g. for ρc = 0.9 at r = 3.75 we have both curves having the same
Pw, i.e., about 50% of cases defectors prevail, while in the remaining cases cooperators
succeed. Figure 4 aims to characterize the same bistable behavior on varying ρc and keeping
fixed r. Plot a of Figure 4 refers to r = 3.75 and it lets emerge an interesting result: in
the range 0.2 ≤ ρc ≤ 0.7 defectors prevail. This indicates that in this region conformism
promotes defection, being 0 the expected value of Pw for both species. Moreover, the bistable
behavior emerges as ρc ≥ 0.8. Plot b of figure 4 refers to r = 4.0 and shows that the upper
bound of the paramagnetic phase (i.e., rM) is reduced to 4.0 as ρc ≥ 0.8. Then, a bistable
behavior emerges for ρc ≥ 0.92. Eventually, in plot c of figure 4 referred to r = 5.25, we see
that even for lower values of ρc cooperators succeed, and the bistable behavior emerges for
ρc ≥ 0.93. In the light of these results, we can state that when r is close to the lower bound
of the paramagnetic phase, i.e., rm, conformism supports defection until the emergence of a
bistable behavior. While, for higher values of r, conformism supports cooperation, and only
for high values of ρc the system becomes bistable.
Finally, we construct an approximate phase diagram of our system — see figure 5. In
the top part we have the domination of cooperation (i.e., red), and in the lower one that
of defection (i.e., blue). Along the line separating the two parts above identified (at fixed
r), we find an important point indicated as ρ∗ below described. In an area of the left
diagram between defection and cooperation, for ρc < ρ
∗ and rm < r < rM(ρc), defectors
and cooperators coexist, with the prevalence of the former. In this region, it is possible to
change the parameters to reach smoothly the cooperation region. For ρc > ρ
∗ we have the
coexistence of cooperation and defection on the transition line r = rm, due to the fact that
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FIG. 5. (Color online) For rm < r < rM and ρc < ρ
∗, we observe a phase where defection and
cooperation coexist, represented in the dashed white line, where the variance is continuous. For
ρc > ρ
∗, the transition from defection to cooperation is sharper at rc. This picture gives the idea
of the existence of a triple point at r = rm, ρc = ρ
∗ where three different behaviors coexist.
rM approaches rm as an increasing function of ρc. The point in which rM = rm is a triple
point.
Summarizing, we studied the spatial PGG in the presence of social influences. In par-
ticular, we considered two different kinds of agents: conformity-driven agents (CDAs) and
fitness-driven agents (FDAs). The former are those that tend imitate the strategy of ma-
jority, while the latter are those that tend to imitate the richest players. In both cases,
CDAs and FDAs update their strategy by considering only their neighborhood. Previous
studies [27, 28, 36] reported that social influences strongly affect evolutionary games. The
proposed model is different from those implemented in previous investigations (e.g. [27, 36]),
results are similar and, on a quality level, further extends their findings. Here, we highlight
the prominent role of conformism in the spatial PGG: it seems that this social influence may
lead the population towards different phases and behaviors, as full cooperation and bistable
equilibria. In particular, conformism promotes the population to reach an ordered phase,
even when a disordered one is expected. For intermediate densities of conformists (e.g. 0.5),
the final equilibrium is that closer to that one would expect considering only FDAs, at a
given r. Therefore, our investigations suggest that conformism drives the system towards
ordered states, with a prevalence for cooperative equilibria. Eventually, we focused on the
identification of an order-disorder transition [38, 41–43] that characterizes the behavior of
our population on varying the degrees of freedom. To conclude, we found that the spatial
PGG under social influences has a very rich behavior, characterized by different final states.
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